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This project estimates the direct rebound effect for the household electricity 
demand in Portugal. While we find evidence of such an effect, the estimations also 
reflect the institutional arrangement that has characterized the electricity market 
in the country. Also, issues related to energy efficiency promotion are addressed in 
general putting into context the case study developed. 
 










1. Introduction  
Proponents of energy efficiency in the context of energy policy have advocated 
its use to curb energy consumption and mitigate security concerns in the attempt to 
address the externalities related to energy production, as is the case of GHG emissions. 
However, the literature does point out to the existence of rebound effects (direct, 
indirect and economy-wide), whenever technological developments allow for the use of 
resources more efficiently, speeding up their rate of consumption and, subsequently, the 
rate of emissions – this is known as the Jevons Paradox.  
When in the presence of the rebound effect, it's possible that the policies aiming 
at curbing energy consumption, as a means to alleviate energy production externalities 
via the allocation resources to energy efficiency, might lead to perverse incentives. 
Nonetheless, instruments intending to promote energy efficiency have been subscribed 
by several countries.  
Under the Portuguese National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (NEEAP) a 
number of pecuniary and non-pecuniary policies are being implemented to promote 
energy efficiency. Notwithstanding, a more fundamental paradigm shift is occurring 
under the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), where Portugal is hereby required to 
liberalize, at least partially, its energy markets with expected price increases in an 
attempt to reduce the energy deficit. Furthermore, externalities related to the production 
of electricity combined with subsidized energy prices, which muddle the information 
channels regarding the actual cost of production, possibly result in an over-consumption 
of electricity. As such, the point in contention requires that these two changing 
archetypes be addressed in a symbiotic perspective, accounting for possible rebound 





acknowledge the magnitude of such effects the rebound effects both in the short-run and 
the long-run. This is an empirical question with relevant important implications. In this 
context, in this project, we attempt to estimate the direct rebound effect for household 
electricity consumption in Portugal, that is, the one that occurs when an improvement in 
energy efficiency for a particular energy service reduces the effective cost of the service 
leading to an increase in energy consumption.  
Finally, despite the current policy efforts to promote energy efficiency, it's 
important to discern why exactly it is that consumers have not responded in accordance 
with what is perceived to be a fundamentally rational adoption of cost-saving energy 
efficient technology. An attempt to establish a possible venue for policy instruments to 
capitalize on the connection between behavioral factors and the adoption of energy 
efficient demand-side technology is undertaken. 
 
2. Energy Efficiency in the Electricity Market 
A recent study by McKinsey (2007) points out that the residential sector 
represents about 25% of total end-use energy demand and potentially harbors the 
highest opportunity for efficiency investment, equivalent to 21% of residential demand 
by 2020. As such, energy efficiency is usually linked to energy conservation and is 
commonly regarded as a possible solution to attenuate problems linked to production 
externalities, such as undesirable Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions and energy 
security, in a second-best scenario, to achieve a given level of energy-based services and 
good.  As energy efficiency increases the amount of required inputs would decrease 
without resulting in output shrinkage along with energy consumption. However, for this 






Understanding whether or not, as well as when and how, intervening to promote 
energy efficiency under these auspices is justified is a central concern. Usually, 
efficiency investments are thought to represent a parallel shift in the demand for energy, 
where an increase in efficiency leads to less energy inputs demanded. This conception 
crumbles considering how individuals cannot gain utility from energy-based services 
when energy inputs are null, as energy is always required under current technology. If 
the impact of an increase in energy efficiency actually resulted in such a blanket 
curtailment in demanded electricity, total consumer welfare from a given amount of 
energy would increase along with energy efficiency, and the demand for energy would 
be subject to a completely different impact altogether for any variation in the  level of 
energy efficiency. As such, a greater level of energy efficiency entails a higher 
electricity price elasticity, which can be traced back to the falling marginal effects of 
energy efficiency on the reservation price of electricity, at high levels of energy 
consumption. 
When the aforementioned factors are considered, an increase in energy 
efficiency denotes that the marginal willingness to pay falls after a certain efficiency 
threshold is attained, causing the demand curve to pivot. This being the case, when the 
price level is sufficiently high, above the aforementioned pivot, energy and energy 
efficiency become complementary goods and are no longer substitutes, as happens for 
low energy prices (Brennan 2009, 2011). As the use of smart-meters and other demand-
side infrastructure improvements also results in increasing prices, the same problem 






3. The Rebound Effect 
While the rebound effect is characterized by both direct and indirect components 
(Khazzoom, 1980), the indirect effect implies that efficiency gains generate potential 
economic growth that would otherwise not have been possible and as output increases 
the overall cost of goods decreases through an income effect, thereby increasing 
consumption of other goods and services, resulting in a higher demand for resources 
related to production. The direct effect, on the other hand, is associated with the 
substitution effect, linking energy efficiency gains to lowered costs of energy 
consumption. As increased efficiency implies that consumption becomes cheaper, an 
incentive for additional demand of energy-based services and goods exists, assuming 
that the price elasticity of demand is not null, thereby counterbalancing what would 
have otherwise been savings had the demand for energy not increased.  
In the context of energy policy, where energy efficiency is often promoted as a 
means to reduce overall energy use, the rebound effect can generate significant 
problems depending on its magnitude. Therefore, it is crucial that the subsequent 
foregone savings are accounted for when assessing instruments to avoid skewed 
outcomes. An extreme example of the rebound effect, deemed as a “backfire”, results in 
expected savings from higher levels of energy efficiency being completely offset  
(Saunders 1992). 
Measuring the rebound effect for each policy scope is extremely important due 
to its heterogeneous nature and interconnectedness with energy demand. For example, 
when the consumption of energy services increases, the saturation effect (from 
decreasing marginal utility) suggests that low income consumers would make up a 





Boardman, 2000). Likewise, the lower cost of energy services implies an increase in 
consumer base, from first-time adoption, reflecting the lower discounted lifetime cost 
for affected appliances (Orasch and Wirl, 1997). Furthermore, empirical estimates of the 
direct rebound effect, based on household energy-based services, for OECD countries 
point towards a magnitude smaller than 30% (Sorrell et al., 2009), while in developing 
countries it may exceed unity (Sorrell, 2007), i.e. higher than 100%, due to a larger 
representation of marginal consumers, which reaffirms the consistency of the satiation 
hypothesis.  
However, even in developed countries, individuals considered to be investing at 
the social optimum level in energy efficiency, despite a higher discount rate, are 
expected to utilize new, more efficient, appliances with higher intensity as a result of 
lower short-run marginal costs. If true, this tendency could potentially account for a 
significant portion of the direct rebound effect in developed countries (Sorrell et al., 
2009).  
Policy discussion on how to minimize the rebound effect in order to guarantee 
higher savings per efficiency investment is centered mostly on increasing the price of 
energy consistently, to mitigate the income effects, and by allowing energy prices to 
internalize the externalities related to energy production (Sorrell, 2007; Maxwell and 
McAndrew, 2011). However, special consideration is required when enacting such 
policies, if energy efficiency is being actively promoted, to avoid having higher energy 
prices leading to a complementary relationship between energy and energy efficiency, as 
previously discussed. Conceding that this is indeed the case, the higher energy price 
would imply that policy promoting energy efficiency would booster energy 





promotion of energy efficiency motivated by energy conservation through policy 
instruments no longer makes sense, leading to increasing economic inefficiency. 
4. Behavioral Issues and the Energy Paradox. 
4.1 - The Efficiency Gap and Consumer Failure 
Consumer choice failures regarding what's perceived as an underinvestment in 
energy efficiency technology are known as the efficiency gap (Stavins et al., 2004) and 
serves as a rationale to support government intervention by its proponents. The extent, 
or existence, of fault in consumer behavior is still a point of contention. Behavioral 
critique is mostly centered on bounded rationality notions, market failures, arguments 
giving clout to adverse responses towards energy conservation, lack of capital or 
diverging public and private discount rates as probable causes for the lagging adoption 
of cost-effective energy efficient technology (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994). A reasonable 
explanation for households under-investing in energy efficiency suggests that it could 
originate from a discrepancy between the social and the private discount rates, and 
doesn't necessarily justify public intervention (Hausman and Joskow, 1982), as it might 
simply reflect the uncertainty of cost and benefits of technology investments 
(Sutherland, 1991) or artificially low social discount rates (Sutherland, 2003). 
To explain part of the efficiency gap, considering capital constraints and private 
discount rates might shed additional light on the subject. In essence, high median 
income households appear to apply discount rates consistent with the social optimum 
when purchasing appliances, whereas lower income households fail to do so 
(Sutherland, 2003). Furthermore, through a British household survey, Jamasb and Meier 
(2010) have shown that those with the low income present reduced income elasticity of 





demand appears being relatively income inelastic. Instead, demographic, housing, as 
well as appliance characteristics seem to be more relevant and ought to be given more 
weight; as if policy is overly focused on income its effectiveness might drop 
unexpectedly (Wiesmann, et al., 2011). Overall, energy-related expenditure appears to 
be significantly driven by household characteristics (Meier and Rehdanz, 2010). 
When scrutinizing technology adoption specifically, of all household 
characteristics, the average level of education is particularly relevant (Brill, Hasset and 
Metcalf, 1999). Empirical results based on German and Italian household data seem to 
corroborate this hypothesis (Carraro, 2011). Other factors, however, do come into play 
when considering the phase-out of old technologies via imposed standards: evidence 
provided by Mills and Schleich (2010) suggests that the number of CFL bulbs installed 
in household lighting sockets is relatively fixed across socio-economic groups. These 
findings reveal a negative relationship between income and CFL adoption, as well as a 
positive relationship between income and total lighting applications.  
All the previous points highlight the heterogeneity between consumers, driven 
by socio-economic grouping, implying different levels of energy efficiency investment 
and, therefore, sway technology choice. That said, the efficiency gap still warrants 
focusing on just how rational consumers actually behave and whether or not agents 
properly consider the discounted lifetime savings of new appliances when making new 
purchases. Specifically, rational consumers are expected to react positively to variations 
in energy efficiency, as they would to a decrease in the price of energy since both 
generate a similar impact on the cost of energy-based services (Sorrell et al. 2009). 
Finally, consumer failure can be illustrated through the common anecdotal 





which portrays an inconsistent, or flawed, outlook regarding energy markets, giving 
further credence to the consumer failure hypothesis (Brennan, 2009). 
4.2 - Non-pecuniary incentives as policy instruments 
From a behavioral perspective, the use of non-pecuniary incentives can be a 
viable vehicle to overcome consumer failure, thereby stimulating investment in energy 
efficient technology. Abrahamse and Steg (2011) have studied both household energy 
consumption and the factors affecting individual alignment with energy conservation, 
apparently driven mainly by psychological determinants, from a socio-demographic 
stand-point, through customers of a utility company. Their empirical observations hint 
towards energy use being strongly dependent not only on household characteristics, but 
also on individual's preferences regarding energy conservation and self-enhancement 
values, such as tradition and motivation. As such, these findings seem to corroborate the 
importance of non-pecuniary incentives to influence individuals' choices. 
Further evidence suggests that individuals respond more positively to certain 
stimuli – the salience effect, which describes how agents respond better to 
psychologically vivid or easily observed factors (Yates and Aronson, 1983). Framing 
also appears to be an important factor, as consumers are most sensitive when potential 
cost-savings are mentioned rather than earnings (Steg and Vlek, 2007). A study by Mills 
(1991) analyzed how receptive were consumers to the adoption of CFLs and concluded 
that the proneness to invest in energy efficiency increased when gradual monthly 
installment payments incorporated into the electricity bill were available. Energy audits 
have also been proposed by Yates and Aronson (1983) as powerful tools, if information 
is presented in a vivid and personalized fashion, when attempting to apply social-





Social pressure can be used as a means to propel technology adoption and 
diffusion through social recognition and approval, by capitalizing on psychological 
characteristics, such as altruism, to alter consumer behavior. This can be seen as an 
instance of the “warm glow” effect resulting in increased utility for individuals when 
contributing to public causes derived from moral satisfaction (Videras and Owen, 2006). 
Non-pecuniary instruments impact energy adoption along the extensive margin, whereas 
pecuniary incentives mostly affect consumers on the intensive margin, thereby implying 
the existence of a social norm elasticity (Herberich et al., 2011) – i.e. consumers which 
are pressured through social incentives are more likely to adopt new technologies 
whereas shifts in prices only work on the quantity, beyond adoption. Likewise, 
normative concerns play a role in supporting energy policy from different angles since 
pecuniary incentives tend to be fleeting, translating into relapsing behavior. However, if 
agents feel morally and positively linked to energy conservation, policy implications 
will be long-lasting and more easily accepted (De Groot and Steg, 2008). Furthermore, 
when products are aligned with consumers' values, experiences and needs, technology 
diffusion rates appear to increase (Wall and Crosbie, 2008). 
6. Policy Instruments (EU context) 
In a broader context, the PNEEAP is just part of a EU wide initiative to improve 
energy efficiency. A brief description of some of these instruments follows. 
6.1 Financial Incentives 
Various action plans have focused on reducing transaction costs and risks usually 
borne by early adopters of new technology through the use of pecuniary incentive 
schemes. Instruments aimed at favoring buildings, which account for a high percentage 





implemented in both Germany and Austria. Lithuania, on the other hand, has focused 
efforts on providing fiscal incentives, such as a lower VAT rate as a means to lower 
costs to suppliers of energy efficient construction components, while the Netherlands 
and Italy have opted towards allowing energy efficiency investments to count towards 
tax deductions.  A group of countries, comprised of Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, 
Spain and Poland have adopted voluntary agreements between private and public 
entities to ensure certain energy efficiency targets defined by accompanying government 
subsidized energy audits are set and achieved. 
Market-based mechanisms are also featured in certain countries, with Italy and 
Poland planning to implement white certificate schemes in the near future, whilst other 
nations, such as the UK and Denmark, focus on more traditional instruments as energy 
efficiency quotas for consumers. 
6.2 Technology Standards 
EU-wide directives have been adopted to serve as guides to equalize energy 
efficiency among member states. The initiative has set minimum efficiency 
requirements for buildings, household appliances and office equipment - building codes 
and efficiency labels are the most common methodologies, while some home appliances 
are limited by Eco-design parameters such as to limit their life-cycle cost; office 
equipment, such as computers, incorporate efficiency compliant software, whereas 
lighting applications have been excluded from using incandescent light bulbs. 
6.3 - Information Campaigns 
Information campaigns have the ultimate goal of achieving higher end-use 
energy efficiency through the dissemination of information. These instruments work by 





triggering agents to adapt their behaviors. Notable examples include an Irish multimedia 
campaign, ranging from press ads to TV programs and others, focused on informing 
individuals regarding different energy sources, inherent costs and other characteristics.  
7. The Case of Portugal 
7.1 The Portuguese National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (PNEEAP) 
Portugal's economy has shown lagging improvements in its economy's energy 
intensity,   assessed at 12.4% above the EU-27 average in 2004, leading to the creation 
of the PNEEAP in 2008. Convergence towards the EU average by 2015 was its main 
goal, which has since been extended to 2020. Energy intensity was to be improved via 
several policies promoting energy efficiency investments, amongst other elements, 
representing 9.8% energy savings, or a reduction in 1,792,493 tonnes of oil equivalent 
(toe), regarding the reference period defined by the European Directive (2001-2005), in 
final energy consumption by 2015. 
Under the latest revision, in 2011, the Portuguese government committed to 
reduce energy consumption primarily through increasing energy efficiency by 25% until 
2020, resulting in a predicted 12.1% drop in final energy consumption, approximately 
2,239,973 toe. Predictions hinge on effects distributed across several sectors, spanning 
from industry to residential and services.  
By the end of 2010, 36.7% of the target had been achieved, a result claiming that 
the plan is perceived as being on schedule with its timely goals. Specifically, the 
residential and services sectors have performed above expectations, with accounted 
cumulative savings of 215,189 toe, resulting from yearly growth in policy effects of 
68% and 285% respectively during the 2008-2009 period. Inefficient equipment 





light bulbs were phased, prompting an increase of 15 billion CFLs) along with shifting 
consumer behavior towards a more energy efficiency favorable predisposition - as 
evidenced by increased sales in high-performance energy household appliances. The 
latest revision also expects the residential and services sectors to generate savings of 
643,417 toe by 2016 in contrast to the previous target of 421,908 to be achieved in 
2015. 
Nevertheless, the latest revision to the PNEEAP asserts that energy policy is 
currently being redefined, as a consequence of the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU), such that no more than general results were presented. However, a few 
ineffective plans have been replaced while the most successful initiatives were either 
renewed or given greater scope. Pending the final status regarding the electricity 
markets, a larger and more comprehensive restructuring of the plan is expected. 
7.1.1 Incentive-based instruments 
Policy instruments based on the impacts of pecuniary effects on demand, as 
several subsidies and fiscal rebates will be granted to promote energy efficient 
materials, buildings and appliances; older or just undesirable technologies will be taxed. 
Electricity tariff reductions in the order of 2.5%, in regard to the previous year, will be 
applied to consumers whose consumption is below 2 thousand kWh, only applicable to 
the main household; Investments in energy efficiency are eligible for fiscal rebates of 
30% up until a maximum of 700 euros; Vouchers of up to 100 euros, based on efficiency 
grade, are to be exchanged for inefficient technology, which is to be recycled, when 
appliances considered to be more efficient are bought. Individuals reporting drops in 
electricity consumption of up to 10% or 20% regarding the previous year will also be 





investments, capped at 10% or 20% of electricity expenditure over two years, 
respectively. On the other hand, electricity tariffs will increase by 5%, considering the 
previous year's tariff, for consumers whose consumption exceeds 4 thousand kWh - not 
applicable to large households or for those currently residing on A/A+ buildings; 
Technology regarded as inefficient will be taxed according to their carbon footprint - in 
the case of light bulbs, 41 cents per incandescent light bulbs, or in a whole life cycle 
cost optic in general. These pecuniary mechanisms are intended to be self-contained, in 
the sense that most of their financing is intrinsic, with the exception of a low interest 
rate credit fund and an insurance policy being set up to cover possible discrepancies.  
7.1.2 Technology standards 
Policy enforcing or recommending the use of certain technologies, such as 
CFLs, and materials, notably Low-Emissivity glass, through the use of energy 
efficiency grading (where A++ represents the highest EE, whereas G the lowest) for 
materials, buildings and appliances is also undertaken. Outside the scope of the 
PNEEAP's instruments, other relevant policies and initiatives had already been 
proposed to accelerate technology diffusion. 
7.1.3 - Information campaigns 
Non-pecuniary instruments ranging from simple educational programs in 
schools to full-fledged marketing techniques, just like the aforementioned energy 
efficiency grading for appliances and buildings, aimed at singling out energy efficiency 
as a desirable trait and through appropriate packaging and labeling as a means to 
captivate and disseminate knowledge regarding possible cost-saving opportunities, 
thereby effectively altering consumer choices and capitalizing on each individual's 





7.2 Memorandum of Understanding 
As of May 2011, Portugal is bound to comply with  general economic policy 
guidelines, conditional to secure further financial assistance from the European 
Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM), to be granted pending quarterly reviews for 
the duration of the programme, prescribed for the second quarter of 2014. Policies that 
are not in line with what has been agreed in the MoU require consultation with 
European Commission, the ECB and the IMF officials (the so called Troika) before 
implementation. The MoU ushers several implications for the Portuguese economy and, 
in particular, energy policy has to be reviewed. Consequently, energy markets for 
electricity and gas are to be liberalized, whilst promoting competition and fostering 
integration with the Iberian market for energy and gas (MIBEL and MIBGAS); Energy 
dependency and renewable energy promotion is to be achieved without comprising 
additional costs to electricity production and policy will be required to be consistent 
overall, such that several existing instruments require reassessment - implying that the 
PNEEAP might suffer further alterations in light of the new energy policy criteria.  
The liberalization of electricity markets hinges on regulated tariffs being phased 
out by January, 2013 at the latest, in order to control the current energy deficit which not 
only distorts the price, but also implies an unsustainable burden on consumers. 
Excessive and extraordinary electricity production costs associated with the ordinary 
regime, associated with electricity production in conventional stations, are to be 
controlled and delimited, demanding renegotiation with electricity producers or a 
downward revision of the currently applicable guaranteed compensation mechanism 
(Custos para a Manutenção do Equilibrio Contratual – CMEC) to power generators, to 





(PPAs) as well. Furthermore, increases in the VAT (from 6% to 23%) and excise taxes 
in the electricity market will be administered. Along with deregulated tariffs, the cost 
per unit of electricity faced by consumers will increase dramatically and behavioral 
repercussions are to be expected. 
Energy policy instruments, such as taxes and subsidies, used to promote energy 
efficiency are, thus, subject to reconsideration under the MoU, to evaluate the risk of 
overlapping or inconsistent instruments with the underlying objective of ensuring the 
correct incentives for rational use, energy savings and emission reductions.  
Additionally, the Third EU Energy Package will be applied, such that the National 
Regulator Authority's independence and enforcement powers are guaranteed. 
8. The Direct Rebound Effect in Portugal in Portuguese Households’ Demand for 
Electricity: A Case Study 
The total net consumption of primary energy in Portugal has risen by 11.4% 
between 1997 and 2008 (Nunes, 2010). Electricity consumption has also been steadily 
increasing in the last decade, except for a brief decline in 2009 of around 1.4%, a 
consequence of the economic crisis. Total electricity consumption resumed growth in 
2010 by 4.7% relative to 2009 and by 3.2% when comparing to 2008; Residential 
consumption only increased by around 1% from 2009 to 2010 and represents 21% of 
total electricity consumption (Direcção Geral de Energia e Geologia, 2011). Electricity 
accounted for 38% of household primary energy consumption in 2009, followed by a 
36% share held by biomass, 16% for liquefied propane gas. Various other fuel sources 
are less relevant. (DGEG, 2011) Nonetheless, in the EU context, Portugal ranks 
relatively low in per capita electricity consumption, with the average citizen consuming 





An in-depth account of current household electricity expenditure might be useful 
to contextualize this case study - an overview of the share of total electricity 
consumption by type of use in 2010 for Portuguese households is measured in Table 1. 
Cooking and small domestic appliances appear to be, by far, the top contributors 
whereas lighting and house heating are also prominent to a lesser extent. 













% 9.06 1.60 2.40 40.52 32.86 13.56 100 
Source: INE 
8.1 Methodology 
When energy efficiency data is unavailable, direct rebound effect estimates rely 
heavily on the use of proxies to capture the effect, namely through the use of demand 
elasticities. For a particular energy service, S, the following condition is obtained 
(Khazzoom, 1980; Sorrell et al, 2009). Following Berkhout et al. (2000),  
                                                                                                       (1) 
where ηe(E) represents the elasticity of demand for energy (E) with respect to energy 
efficiency (e) and ηe(S) is the elasticity of demand for energy services (S) with respect 
to energy efficiency. Energy services, S, equal the demand for energy regarding the 
efficiency level, eE, such that under this condition the elasticity of demand for energy 
with respect to energy efficiency equals the elasticity of demand for energy-based 
services with respect to energy efficiency minus one. Incorporating energy demand, 
which provides an upper bound for the direct rebound effect, (Sorrell and 
Dimitropoulos, 2007a) is one viable approach. Assuming that consumers respond 





that energy efficiency is independent from energy prices, , and since the 
price of a specific energy-based service is given by the ratio between the associated cost 
of energy and level of energy efficiency,  (Sorrell, 2007), equation (1) can be 
rearranged as follows: 
                                                                                                   (2) 
where  denotes the elasticity of demand for energy with respect to the price of 
energy. Nevertheless, it's important to note that direct rebound effect estimates using the 
own-price demand elasticity results are more appropriate when dealing with specific 
energy services and are somewhat biased against aggregation, such as the case of 
household electricity consumption. This can be easily seen when large own-price 
demand elasticity suggests that improvements in the overall efficiency of electricity 
would lead to large direct rebound effects or that the direct rebound effect for the energy 
services that dominate electricity consumption may be large (Sorrell, 2009). 
 
8.2 Econometric Model 
Estimations for the rebound effect can be derived from different approaches. We 
estimate the direct rebound effect in the short-run and the long-run by modeling the 
demand for electricity consumption of Portuguese households (heating, cooling, 
cooking) from 1994 to 2009. A Fixed Effects Model (FEM) provides estimates for the 
long-run elasticities, whereas an Error Correction Model (ECM) supplies estimates for 
short-term elasticities.  
Data was gathered in constant prices according to the 7 NUTS-II territorial 
demarcations, according to municipal agglomerates. The series were constructed from 





Eurostat and the National Climatic Data Center. 
Given data availability constraints, both price and income elasticities are 
estimated through a constant elasticity demand dynamic standard function, specified in 
the log-log functional form (Haans and Biermayr, 2000). Besides price and income as 
explanatory variables of electricity demand, the heating degree days, given by the sum 
of daily mean temperature degrees below a reference temperature to account for annual 
disturbances, should also be included. Therefore, equation (3) below specifies the 
household electricity demand to be estimated,  
                                                                 (3) 
where  represents energy consumption in period t;  is the average price of electricity 
in period t;  are the heating degree-days in period t;  is the disposable income of 
households in period t; c represents the intercept.  
To estimate the long-run elasticities, the FEM with Cross-Section weights 
estimation was performed using the GLS (Generalized Least Squares) method, to 
capture time independent effects that are likely correlated with the dependent variable, 
resulting in the following equation: 
                                                   (4) 
where “i” is the NUTS-II region, and “t” the year in question. As such,  are the 
estimation residuals for region i in year t.  
The estimated results for the short-run are presented in Table 2. The presence of 








Table 2 - FEM of household electricity demand, GLS/Cross-Section weights 
Dependent Variable:   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic  (CVs: 1%*; 5%* ; 10%***)Prob.   
     
     
 10.60740 0.317894 33.36771 0.0000* 
 -0.247062 0.069857 -3.536682 0.0006* 
 1.045724 0.023041 45.38613 0.0000* 
 0.028102 0.013944 2.015314 0.0465** 
     
     
R-squared 0.999064     Mean dependent var 23.03351 
Adjusted R-squared 0.998982     S.D. dependent var 6.273530 
S.E. of regression 0.044895     Sum squared resid 0.205585 
F-statistic 12099.31     Durbin-Watson stat 0.926093 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Variables are statistically significant according to a 1%, 5% and 10% (*,**,***) 
In order to deal with autocorrelation in the series, the model is adjusted by 
adding the dependent variable, Ct, with a one-period lag as an additional regressor, as 
suggested by Beck (2001)
1
. Table 3 presents the results of the new FEM estimation, see 
equation (5). As can be observed, the estimate for the price is deemed significant, and 
has the expected sign; the same is true for income and the HDDs. The R-squared value 
of 0.999 indicates an excellent fit. The estimate for the long-run rebound effect is 
around 21%.  
                                  (5) 
Unit roots are a structural concern for the validity of the model, to avoid a 
spurious relation. When testing, as documented in annex A, towards the existence of 
unit roots in lnY and lnP. As such, these series are non-stationary. However, the 
cointegration test output shown in annex A indicates the existence of a I(1) cointegration 
relationship arising from a linear combination between the original series. Therefore, 
despite the presence of individual non-stationarity in lnP and lnY, a stable equilibrium is 
likely to exist, ruling out a spurious estimation. Therefore, the FEM in (5) can be 
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considered as a valid representation of the long-run relationship between the variables.  
Table 3 - FEM of household electricity demand, GLS/Cross-Section weights 
(Includes a lagged version of the dependent Variable: )  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic (CVs: 1%*; 5%* ; 10%***)Prob.   
     
     
 1.120694 0.606772 1.846977 0.0679*** 
 -0.213890 0.034703 -6.163399 0.0000* 
 0.159844 0.051096 3.128319 0.0023* 
 0.010473 0.005513 1.899659 0.0605*** 
 0.854572 0.050113 17.05286 0.0000* 
     
     
R-squared 0.999775     Mean dependent var 23.77820 
Adjusted R-squared 0.999751     S.D. dependent var 9.460783 
S.E. of regression 0.024005     Sum squared resid 0.054165 
F-statistic 41793.61     Durbin-Watson stat 2.791246 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   
     
E     
     
Variables are statistically significant according to a 1%, 5% and 10% (*,**,***) 
In this context, capturing the short-run elasticities requires the use of an ECM, to 
exploit the existing I(1) cointegration which is itself stationary, by using the error term 
in (3), , as the equilibrium error in the ECM. 
Table 4 - ECM of household electricity demand, GLS/Cross-Section weights 
Dependent Variable:   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic (CVs: 1%*; 5%* ; 10%***)Prob.   
     
     
 -0.308001 0.050751 -6.068842 0.0000* 
 -0.020764 0.069678 -0.297992 0.7664 
 0.005157 0.004588 1.124010 0.2639 
 1.061272 0.076826 13.81404 0.0000* 
 -1.861033 0.127350 -14.61356 0.0000* 
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.628584     Mean dependent var 0.052649 
Adjusted R-squared 0.612609     S.D. dependent var 0.033673 
S.E. of regression 0.019372     Sum squared resid 0.034899 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.949113    
     
     
Variables are statistically significant according to a 1%, 5% and 10% (*,**,***) 
Thus, the ECM is constructed by lagging all variables in equation (5) one period 





. The output in Table 4 is obtained by estimating the ECM, via the GLS procedure 
with cross-section weights, according to the following equation: 
 (6) 
Note that disposable income, Y, and Heating degree days, HDD, are not significant –
suggesting that these variables might not be relevant drivers of demand in the short-run, 
in contrast to the short-run case. Price elasticity is significant and carries the expected 
sign, revealing a short-run rebound effect estimate with a magnitude of 31%. The 
ECM‟s R-squared is not as high as in the previous estimation, but is in-line with similar 
models in the literature. Nonetheless, the error correction mechanism's high statistical 
significance provides further evidence of a long-run relationship in levels between all 
the variables and supports the choice of an ECM to deal with short-run effects.   
According to these results, the elasticity of electricity demand by households is 
larger in the short-run than in the long-run, which runs counter to economic theory. 
However, a reasonable explanation for this lies in the regulatory framework in Portugal, 
where prices are not freely decided in the marketplace. The political intervention in the 
electricity market introduces rigidity which may explain the results obtained. 
However, these figures are still indicative of the magnitude of the direct rebound 
effect's in Portugal for households‟ consumption of electricity (heating, cooling and 
cooking), 21% in the long-run and 30% in the short-run. Furthermore, these results can 
be considered in-line with similar estimations in other developed nations, as is the case 
of the USA, with results ranging from 32% to 38% (Guertin et al., 2003), and Catalonia, 
Spain, with a short-run effect of 35% and 49% for the long-run (Gonzaléz, 2010). 
Further research, to improve on these results, might require gathering less aggregate 






9. Concluding Remarks 
Even when implementing relatively mild and conservative policy instruments as 
is the case of those included in the PNEEAP, relative to other EU member states, it has 
been established in this work that policymakers ought to take concurrent events into 
account carefully, as the project to advance the liberalization of the electricity market 
will generally lead to higher energy pricing. With this in mind and under the rationale of 
energy conservation, actively promoting energy efficiency when prices are high may 
increase energy consumption due to the presence of a direct rebound effect which 
implies that energy efficiency should not be further encouraged by policy intervention. 
.In fact, our direct rebound effect estimates for electricity consumption in Portuguese 
households imply that an increase in energy efficiency leading to savings in electricity 
consumption of 10 would only materialize in savings of 7.9 in the long-run and 7.0 in 
the short-run.  
Finally, we conclude that behavioral aspects are also extremely important when 
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Unit Root tests 
Series Unit Root Test ADF Result (Critical values, 
1%*; 5%** and 10%***) 
Integration 
order 
LnC Levels -1.29916 Reject Ho*** I(0) 
LnY Levels 1.52197 Don't Reject Ho*  
 1
st
 differences -3.30925 Reject Ho* I(1) 
LnP Levels 6.26959 Don't Reject Ho*  
 1
st
 differences -4.86600 Reject Ho* I(1) 
LnHDD Levels -4.20539 Reject Ho* I(0) 
LnC(-1) Levels -1.52234 Reject Ho*** I(0) 
Ho: Individual unit root process 
When AD > Z–Choi Chi-Squared 
critical value 
 Individual intercept 







Series: lnc lny lnhdd 
lnc 




Panel ADF-Statistic -1.565809 -7.632896 Reject Ho**/* 
Panel PP-Statistic -1.930246 -9.507280 Reject Ho*/* 
Ho: No Cointegration Individual intercept 
Lag length based on AIC 
 
